Tottenham 3-6 Liverpool – Recreating Liverpool’s tactic

After watching this game on TV and seeing how fluid the Liverpool team were in their movements, as well as how they exploited an under strength Tottenham side, I wanted to see if I could attempt to recreate the tactic within Football Manager.

It’s worth saying that tactics, roles and team shape can and do change throughout a game as managers tweak and tinker, whether that be in response to the game state, substitutions who come with their own style and approach to play, or perhaps opposition adjustments. Therefore, I’ll be trying to create a replication of this in what I will call the ’round’, i.e. by capturing the general patterns and pivotal moments.

If you’re eager to try the tactic, you can download it here or find it on the Steam Workshop here. For those interested in the thought process behind it, read on.

Background Research & Tactical Planning

The first thing to do was to undertake some research into the team shape, and check that the overall positioning of the players matched those that I saw whilst enjoying the action.

Here, we can see the overall team shape, as well as their passing quantities, link-ups and their ‘OBV’ (on-ball value).

Here’s what stood out:

1. Shape: Liverpool employed a 2-4-4 setup with advanced full-backs level with the defensive midfielders.
2. False Nine Role: Luis Díaz functioned as a false nine, dropping into the space between Spurs’ defense and midfield, effectively leaving Liverpool without a traditional striker.

As a result, my first instinct was to go with the above formation.

This should allow both full backs to advance to create the 2-4, and it will also nicely stagger the defensive midfielders through the use of a defensive midfielder on defend and segundo volante on support. Gravenberch should sit and hold things together in the ‘6’ role, whilst Mac Allister will push forward, reminiscent of his run for the headed goal against Spurs (see image below).

Something that has been noticeable under Slot is just how many bodies are in the box when the ball is being crossed in. This will need monitoring to see if the above approach is able to mimic this.

Luis Díaz, in the false nine role, will be perfect, dropping into the hole between the last line of the defence and the midfield. This is only a starting point though. I’m not sold on all the roles, nor positioning of some of them. The only one that I think is absolutely nailed is Gakpo’s inverted winger role. The Dutch wide forward does look to hold his width until he cuts in across the box and shoot.

Some might think that Trent Alexander-Arnold’s role is too reserved, as he’s typically more aggressive than this, but I’ll explain this later when we dig into the player instructions later. I will point out the image above again as evidence as to just how deep he was at times during the game – and with a lot of space around him too.

In terms of team instructions, adopting a positive mentality seems the most appropriate given the team’s general approach to attacking football, yet with a degree of control around possession.

Along the same line of thinking, shorter passing, playing out of defence and working the ball into the box should mean the players progress the ball up the pitch through the lines. However, something that was definitely seen was how often the players looked to exploit the space in behind Spurs’s defence by playing balls over the top or into the box for players to run onto.

Liverpool were frequently pressing the Spurs defence when out of possession, so counter-pressing when the ball is lost is an absolute given, and they typically looked to counter quickly. This is something that Liverpool haven’t always done under Slot as they’ve gone for a more reserved approach under the Dutch coach. Part of the thinking to up the press, I suspect, was because they recognised that they could best exploit Spurs through speed of attack, hitting them before they were able to protect their inexperienced defence.

Below is one such example from the second half. Note just how high Van Dijk is, well inside the Tottenham half. Mac Allister is man-marking his opposite man and Robertson is in a foot race with Kulusevski to get to the loose ball. If Robertson gets there first, he’s plenty of teammates he can lay it off to. If he doesn’t, another can help him win the ball back, with no real support for the Swedish international.

Looking at the pass network and duels map from Dr Phil Barter on Bluesky below is a great aid in spotting some further patterns within the formation and the zones in which the players were operating in.

When it comes to duels, these were taking place all over the pitch. There was clearly no intent to have pressing traps centrally or out wide, so there will be no team instructions on where to channel the oppositions play. According to Opta data, Spurs lost the ball 43 times in their own defensive third and 55 times in the middle third. A higher defensive line, high press and press more often are consequently natural selections for the team instructions.

It also confirms that Luis Díaz did indeed spend a lot of his time in the left half-space, creating an overload with Gakpo to pin back Pedro Porro. Gakpo was more advanced on the ball compared to Díaz as the Colombian dropped deep, as the below image (taken from the Premier League’s website) also clearly shows. Mac Allister, Gravenberch, Díaz and Szoboszlai created a box midfield/squashed diamond to exploit the space that Spurs were leaving them by pressing onto the double pivot. Here, Gomez is about to break straight through the forward line of Spurs by playing a ball into Szoboszlai, meaning six of Spurs’s players then found themselves in front of the ball.

It also shows just how isolated Mohamed Salah was from the rest of the team, so perhaps a raumdeuter might be a better option for him. My concerns about a raumdeuter is that whilst the point is for the role to be isolated, Salah also looked to spend time within the Spurs 18-yard box in a relatively central location.

The below image from Opta’s theanalyst.com shows Salah’s dribbles (triangles – successful = blue border, unsuccessful = red border) and his shots (blue border with green line = goal, green border and line = on-target, red = off-target, blue border with blue line = blocked). This will need further investigation through testing and seeing whether the inside forward on attack will be appropriate. Encouraging him via a player instruction to sit narrower could be sufficient.

What’s also noticeable is how much the play goes down the flanks rather than through the middle, so no playmaker roles should be selected. I’ll debate with myself as to whether I should look to focus play down both flanks, but I’m sceptical as to whether that actually works.

Another important observation is how often Alexander-Arnold linked up with Luis Díaz given the thickness of the line. Given their relative distance, Alexander-Arnold was supplying passes over the top and crossing into the box, as per the assist for Díaz’s first goal (see the below image). However, look how deep he is, in particular compared to Robertson, and how Gomez came over to help him against Son.

The below graphic from markstats on Bluesky shows how deep Alexander-Arnold was when crossing the ball, providing further evidence that Alexander-Arnold was happy to whip in crosses from deep, rather than from the byline. As such, wing back on support looks right for this tactic from this game in isolation. Equally, in terms of player instructions, Alexander-Arnold will be told to cross more often, from deep and into the centre. Given the team instruction to pass into space, this could see some dangerous crosses being whipped in from him for Gakpo and Díaz to run onto.

Tactic Testing

After an initially encouraging pre-season from the highlights, I went into the first game of the season at home against Chelsea. Below is the pass map showing the connections between the players and the number of passes in a 1-0 victory.

In comparison to the real-life Spurs game, Salah is not advanced enough and is far too wide, and Szoboszlai is too wide too. Díaz is in an average position where I’d like him to be, so having him in an asymmetric position off to the left half-space looks to be right. Robertson is also more advanced relative to Alexander-Arnold, which is another goal achieved.

Alexander-Arnold didn’t attempt many crosses in this game (just three times from open play), so it’s too early to say whether the cross from deep instruction is effective.

I continued to monitor this in the next league games, which included a 1-1 draw to Leeds (thanks to a sloppy pass by Konaté).

Here, Salah is well advanced, that’s good. The 2-4 set up at the back also looks good, but we’re not advanced enough in general, and is reflected in our heat map. We barely broke into the Leeds 18-yard box, so a draw was perhaps a fair result, despite an xG difference of 1.67 (2.19 xG – 0.52 xGA)

Therefore, changes need to be made to alter this and adapt my initial thoughts. Szoboszlai needs to be more central and more attacking. I’d missed just how central he was in the first image I posted in this blog when putting the tactic together. This will also have the advantage of creating more space for Salah to operate in, and it will mean that there’s someone to run at the defence from midfield into the space created by Díaz.

Here’s the resulting updated tactical structure:

The next game at home against Southampton was the first chance to see how this adaptation matched what I’m looking to replicate.

The 4-1 result was really encouraging, with two goals from Gakpo, and one each from Szoboszlai and Díaz. Here’s the first goal from Gakpo. Alexander-Arnold was playing notably deep, we had plenty of players in their 18-yard box and Salah has isolated the opposition defender to make the cross for Gakpo to head it in at the far post.

The second goal from Gakpo was a technically brilliant effort from the edge of the box Díaz. This interplay between the two has been great to see develop. Note how Salah and Szoboszlai occupy the back line to create the space for Gakpo to take the time on his shot to rifle it in.

For our third, we’re already well advanced into the Southampton half, with our four forwards in the box as Tsimikas has the ball out wide. The Greek full back played it in to Mac Allister who was in space, and as he carried the ball towards the box, Szoboszlai drifted away from his man by pulling out of the area, where he then drilled it into the top corner. Not exactly working the ball into the box, but I can’t deny it’s a quality strike.

For our final goal, we can see how the pass the ball into space option provided us with the chance to exploit an opponent’s high line. Despite Díaz playing as a false nine, he’s still prepared to run in behind the Southampton back line, and Szoboszlai has the technique, space and vision to spot the opportunity. The lofted ball is expertly laid on for Díaz to slot it beyond Ramsdale.

Our xG (1.69) in this game was actually lower than the Leeds game, indicating how ruthless we were in front of goal.

A few more games into the season, we faced Brighton at home, and this game also demonstrated similar patterns of play and team shape that led to goals.

The first was a cross from Bradley, from deep, onto the head of Núñez who had crept off the shoulder of his defender. It’s probably worth noting that I don’t play Núñez as a false nine, because although he has played a variation of his striker role for Slot compared to Klopp, he’s still more of a hustling pressing forward.

This goal compares really well to the first goal that Liverpool scored against Spurs, with a whipped cross into the centre of the area, met by the head of the Liverpool forward. It’s just a pity that it’s by the deputies.

What has been so impressive is the form of the front ‘four’, regardless of who is playing. Díaz, Gakpo, Salah and Núñez have twenty-two goals between them across twelve games.

Equally, when it comes to the defensive solidity that Slot appears to have instilled, then the tactic also seems to be matching up well here too. If we ignore the 1-6 slaughter by Man City (who are God-like in this save having won the previous season’s league with 96 points, some 17 more than Klopp managed before leaving (I started the save from February 2024 and then holidayed until 1st July)), then we’ve only conceded five goals in eleven games.

This process has been a lot of fun, and is something that I’d like to replicate. Look out for more when I’m piqued by a tactic, probably a Slot-inspired one since I tend to watch Liverpool games more than others being a fan of the club.

A reminder that if you want to try the tactic for yourself, you download it here or find it on the Steam Workshop here.

Thanks for reading. Until next time.